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Introduction 
The study of financial innovation is hardly a new endeavor.  Although much of the 
current literature is rooted in the development of security design during the 1980’s and 
1990’s when seemingly countless new and arcane offerings were floated in the market, 
financial historians have been marking (and at times lamenting) the periodic surge in 
innovative products and services for decades.  For instance, Graham and Dodd in their 
1934 classic Security Analysis provide an appendix that lists no fewer than 258 different 
securities, many of which could easily be recognized in today’s markets.  The authors 
remark that any attempt to list every available security of the time would “extend the size 
of this volume beyond the reasonable limits.”1 
But why does this myriad of products exist, and why do certain periods of history 
seem to be more conducive to innovation than others?  These are fundamental questions 
that market observers have grappled with extensively.  Consequently, there exists a 
number of competing theories and models used to explain the inherent functions and 
structure of an efficient economic system and the process of financial innovation.  One 
broad school of thought emphasizes the network and activities of discrete institutional 
organizations (i.e. banks, insurance companies, exchange markets, etc.) as the central 
impetus behind the development of new products.  This institutional perspective seeks to 
explain the process of innovation as a function of relatively static organizations creating 
and promoting their wares and services competitively, generally in response to shifts in 
technology, taxes or regulation.  Most importantly with this viewpoint, product design is 
largely framed by managerial objectives of organizational survival and profitability, rather 
than some form of external motivation.  But I argue that explanations of this nature are 
somewhat superficial, and is biased toward recent history since important steps in the 
                                       
1 B. Graham and D. Dodd, Security Analysis, Whittlesley House, New York, 1934, 1st ed. 
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evolution of security design can be traced back to times when many of the tax and 
regulatory issues of today were non-existent. 
Robert Merton (1995) offers an alternative model to the institutional approach.  
Merton sees an ideal financial system as providing a finite set of important functions, 
such as the ability to aggregate and transfer economic resources and the ability to handle 
asymmetric information and agency conflicts.  He feels these functions – each of which 
must be addressed in some fashion for the system to operate properly – have been 
relatively constant throughout history and across geographic boundaries.  Similar to the 
previous perspective, institutional players act as financial intermediaries in providing 
these functions, and the technological, regulatory and tax framework is a costly “friction” 
to their activities.  But Merton argues that the success – or even the very existence – of a 
particular institution is neither assured (nor likely) as certain functions become more 
crucial than others in the evolution of the financial system.   
Ultimately, this thesis argues that Merton’s functional perspective is a more robust 
model with which to explain (and even predict) financial innovation than the counter 
example.  Although institutional forces have been and will likely continue to be 
influential in shaping the economic system, the functional perspective provides a more 
“reliable and enduring frame of reference” upon which to study the evolution of security 
design.2   
Merton’s argument begins with a relatively stable and finite set of easily 
recognizable functions that any efficient financial system should perform, with history 
providing a wealth of examples and trends to support his claim.  Many scholars applying 
the functional perspective to advances in financial product design cite the advent of 
                                       
2 R. Merton, “A functional perspective of financial intermediation,” Financial Management, Summer 1995, p. 
24. 
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securitization as one of the most illustrious examples of Merton’s theory.  Although home 
and commercial real estate-backed securities are often central to these academics’ 
discussion of securitization, little has been written with respect to the fundamental role of 
the real property markets in the evolution of security design, particularly when viewed in 
relation to the gradual progression of secured financing toward greater market efficiency.   
Tufano enhances Merton’s ideas by proposing that “exogenous shocks and the life 
cycles of households, companies, industries and nations affect the mix of functions the 
financial system is called upon to deliver.”3  Tufano sees changing factors such as taxes 
and regulatory hurdles as mere “institutional imperfections” that make operation of the 
financial system a costly endeavor.  Furthermore, the cost/benefit structure of existing 
financial products and services is periodically upset by fundamental macroeconomic 
shifts, which opens the way for more innovation.  Trends in real property clearly 
represent one of the most important cyclical macro-forces at work any financial system.  
Consequently, I will briefly examine the impact of secular trends in real estate 
(particularly cyclical downturns) as a motivating force behind financial innovation.  This 
thesis will also examine two seemingly disparate capital-intensive sectors – the U.S. 
railroad industry and commercial real estate market – in relation to Tufano’s ideas and 
Merton’s concept of the “spiral of innovation,” or the process by which one innovation 
lowers the cost of developing the next innovative product. 
 
Do Institutions Matter? 
The functional perspective of an efficient financial system as advanced by Robert 
Merton differs fundamentally from an institutional perspective.  The functional frame of 
                                       
3 P. Tufano, “Securities innovations: A historical and functional perspective,” Journal of Applied Corporate 
Finance, Winter 1995, p. 91. 
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reference maintains that financial intermediaries serve to fulfill a finite but evolving set of 
economic functions often via innovative products and processes, whereas the latter 
perspective holds that innovation is the result of a relatively static institutional structure 
(i.e. banks, insurance companies, fund managers, etc.) working to perform their 
respective intermediary role more efficiently in response to changing market conditions, 
such as taxes and regulation.  
Ross (1989) makes a compelling case in defense of the importance of institutions 
by emphasizing the “contractual framework” binding financial market participants in 
determining the “opacity” of a particular institution.  He broadly defines this contractual 
framework as a “complex set of implicit and explicit contractual relations” that determine 
the duties and restrictions between market participants.4  These constraints prevent 
products in the market from strictly reflecting individual retail preference.  Therefore, 
innovation is an institutional response to the challenges imposed by these constraints and 
varying degrees of opacity.  As a new product is accepted by the market and becomes 
standardized and more reflective of retail preference, the costs associated with marketing 
that product decrease, and consequently, less-opaque higher volume market participants 
eventually rise as the lowest cost providers of this service.   
Ross views the financial system in terms of institutional players with varying 
degrees of opacity, bound by contractual obligations.  An institution’s opacity is largely 
determined by the extent its activities and products reflect the preferences and control of 
retail participants.  The contractual framework constraining market participants prevents 
products and services from fully reflecting the retail preferences of individuals.  Certain 
players in the system are virtually transparent (for instance, mutual funds) generally 
                                       
4 S. Ross, “Presidential address: Institutional markets, financial marketing and financial innovation,” Journal 
of Finance, 1989, Volume 44, Issue 3, p.541. 
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acting as pass-through entities for their basic, well-defined fee-based services which are 
usually standard and commoditized.  Little (if any) agency conflict exists with transparent 
institutions since control largely remains with the retail participant, both in terms of initial 
product choice and on-going monitoring/maintenance.  Consequently, although 
transparency results in greater efficiency, it is generally not conducive to innovation. 
Opaque institutions display the opposite of these qualities, according to Ross.  
Institutions with a high degree of opacity (i.e. insurance companies) are “clouded and 
veiled from the view of [other] participants.”5  Their wares and services are often non-
standardized, highly-negotiated instruments subject to strict regulatory and tax constraints.  
For instance, insurance policies are generally tailored to the needs and risk of the policy 
holder, and the buyer has virtually no say (or even knowledge) of how premiums are re-
invested.  Although this informational disparity and resulting agency conflict is an 
obstacle to efficiency, it marks fertile ground for innovative financial products. 
Ross views innovation as a process by which institutions overcome challenges 
arising from varying degrees of opacity.  As the cost to market a particular product drops 
due to acceptance and standardization, the product migrates from the more to less 
opaque participant, and consequently, from less to greater retail market control.  Most 
importantly for our discussion, Ross asserts that the proper role of an institution in the 
financial marketplace is a function of its level of opacity (which is largely determined by 
the extent to which its products and services reflect retail preference, which in turn is 
determined by the firm’s position in the contractual framework.)  For instance, the 
contractual obligations that essentially set the level of opacity of investment banks make 
that institutional class the most appropriate entity for developing and marketing new 
                                       
5 S. Ross, p.542. 
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corporate investment products, which are eventually standardized and work their way to 
retail market efficiency.   
These ideas raise a number of unanswered questions, however.  Ross sees opacity 
stemming from agency relationships between institutions, not the inherent sectors or 
markets in which they operate.   One can argue that many institutions would be no more 
or less opaque (and reflective of retail preference) regardless of the level of regulation or 
the way they contractually structure their activities.  Opacity, viewed in terms of 
informational disparities and agency issues, may arise from the very nature of the sector 
in which the institution operates, such as housing finance or international trade.  
Furthermore, Ross’ argument implies uniform opacity (i.e. that virtually all the activities of 
a particular institutional class are under the same umbrella of opacity.)  This runs contrary 
to intuition however; opacity is certainly different depending upon one’s viewpoint, 
either geographically or in terms of the sequential steps in which a particular product or 
service is provided.  Institutions are often involved in a wide-range of activities with 
varying degrees of retail choice and control.  Informational differences and agency 
conflicts are heavily influenced by the participant’s geographic or sectoral point of view.   
Furthermore, it is difficult to determine at what point in the procedural life of a product 
or service that it stops reflecting the preferences of individuals and starts mirroring 
conditions and standards of the market.  Ross identifies a particular class of institution 
(investment banks) as the most-logical sponsor of innovative financial products, but fails 
to identify why a certain period in history or sector (notably real estate) seem to be more 
conducive to innovation than others.  Ultimately Ross’ argument provides a cogent 
framework for conceptualizing the interaction between institutional and retail forces, but 
does little to address our question of what role real estate plays in fostering financial 
innovation, or even why the financial system exists at all.  
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Admittedly, it is difficult to counter Ross’ notion that institutional forces have had a 
tremendous impact on the global financial system.  He feels that financial markets are 
largely “institutional markets,” whereby institutions are not the sole players, but are 
certainly the most dominant, and therefore the primary source of innovation.  Ultimately, 
few (if any) scholarly reviews of the financial system omit an important role for 
institutions. 
But Merton’s viewpoint provides a more comprehensive and fundamental model 
of the system’s structure and processes, beginning with his initial suggestions that 1) 
financial functions are generally more constant than institutions (i.e. the basic roles of 
financial intermediaries change less over time and geographic boundaries than the 
institutions themselves) and 2) the institutional structure is largely shaped by competitive 
forces to perform each participant’s respective function(s) more efficiently, and does not 
ensure either the permanence nor success of any participant (i.e. the dominance of one 
particular type of institution is generally dependent upon its ability to fulfill a particular 
function efficiently and profitably relative to its peers.)  Merton argues that even though 
institutional forces throughout history are considerable, a fundamental understanding of 
any financial system must begin with the function(s) a given product or institution serves, 
particularly in its ability to “facilitate the allocation and deployment of economic 
resources, both spatially and temporally, in an uncertain environment.”6 
 
Merton’s Six Functions 
Merton identifies six core functions performed by a financial system.  These 
functions are: 
1) a method for clearing and settling payment, 
                                       
6 R. Merton, p. 23. 
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2) a means by which interests are pooled for large-scale investment, 
3) a way to transfer economic resources through time and across geographic 
regions and industries, 
4) a means of managing risk, 
5) a provider of price information to help coordinate decentralized decision-
making in various sectors of the economy, 
6) a process of managing asymmetric information and agency issues between 
capital providers and those in need of capital. 
Merton argues that these basic functions have largely remained constant in all economies, 
irrespective of time or geographic boundary.  Although these functions are relatively 
stable, the means and methods by which they are handled and the entities best suited to 
serve these functions evolve in response to technological advances, regulatory and tax 
changes, and other shifting conditions – all of which change the priority of demands 
placed upon the system by society.  In response to evolving macroeconomic factors and 
consumption patterns, certain functions may play a greater role than others during a 
given period in history, location or sector. 
The demands and qualities of real estate investment address a number of Merton’s 
basic functions, particularly with respect to the pooling of interests, the transfer of 
economic resources, and risk management.  Furthermore, although the introduction of 
various retail mortgage products, residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities, 
collateralized mortgage obligations, home equity loans, and the myriad of other forms of 
first and second lien real property debt and real estate-backed preferred and common 
equity are routinely cited by scholars using the functional perspective to broadly analyze 
financial market evolution, little has been said with respect to the fundamental role of 
real estate in spurring financial innovation.   
 12
 
The Pooling of Interests 
Pooling is the means by which the economic interests of various parties are 
combined to fund a specific indivisible project or efficient-scale enterprise.  Without 
pooling, a firm could undertake a capital decision no greater than what could be funded 
via its existing internal resources, thereby severely constraining business scale and 
efficiency.  Furthermore, diversification among various capital projects would be difficult 
without tremendous internal sources of capital, or could only be accomplished via an 
array of smaller, potentially less-efficient or unprofitable projects.  Pooling permits the 
partial purchase or sale of an asset, thereby freeing resources to meet other cash 
requirements.  Without pooling, capital decisions are generally an “all-or-nothing” 
proposition.     
With respect to real estate, the inability to pool resources would render 
homeownership virtually impossible for all but the wealthiest of individuals, as was the 
case before the advent of building and loan institutions, and then the Federally-chartered 
home credit agencies,  which eventually lead to the modern mortgage securitization 
market.  The aggregation of financial resources to help facilitate homeownership is 
pooling at its most basic.  This is accomplished via multiple bilateral contracts between 
households (both depositors and borrowers) and a financial intermediary.  Furthermore, 
the social benefits of pooling with respect to real estate in the form of reduced borrowing 
costs and greater liquidity are well documented.7  This is particularly true in the United 
States, which arguably has the most advanced and efficient mortgage market in the 
world, and consequently one of the highest rates of private homeownership as well.  
                                       
7 See Sirmans and Benjamin (1990), Hendershott and Shilling (1989) and Jameson, Dewan and Sirmans 
(1990). 
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Merton cites the creation of a national mortgage market as the prime example of the 
social benefits of financial innovation with respect to pooling.8 
Similarly, Sirri and Tufano mention the advent of mortgage backed securities 
(MBS) as one of the most fundamental examples of multilateral pooling, particularly due 
to the homogeneity and relatively low individual servicing and monitoring needs of the 
collateral.9  Indeed, much of the real estate market (both commercial and residential) is 
readily defined by a relatively finite set of statistical measures, such as vacancy levels, 
lease terms and rates, location and basic physical characteristics.  Consequently, disparate 
investors who may have minimal detailed knowledge of a particular market or borrower 
can adequately assess the risk of the overall investment vehicle with confidence.  (Note: 
although these qualities are inherent to real estate, the descriptive data was not always 
available [nor trusted] by potential investors as we will see in the next chapter.)  
Naturally, some on-going servicing and monitoring still exists by the very nature of 
mortgage securitization.  Consequently, agency conflicts are a possibility since the 
servicer, who may have limited financial interest in the venture, generally seeks to strictly 
limit its direct costs in servicing the pool.  Fortunately, performing mortgage collateral 
generally requires little in the way of on-going servicing and maintenance, thereby 
minimizing the agency conflict.  Furthermore, third-party guarantees (either from the 
government or private insurers) further minimizes investors’ concerns regarding on-going 
servicing. 
Advances in mortgage securitization, particularly in the form of over-
collateralization and credit enhancement (i.e. subordination and third-party guarantees) 
are often as a result of innovative solutions to agency and monitoring issues.  
                                       
8 R. Merton, “Financial innovation and economic performance,” The Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 
Volume 4, Issue 4, p. 14. 
9 E. Sirri and P. Tufano, et. al. The global financial system: A functional perspective, Harvard Business 
School Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995, p.116. 
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Furthermore, these financially-engineered solutions have migrated to other cutting-edge 
sectors of security design as well.  Sirri and Tufano site the need for on-going monitoring 
and lack of homogeneity as the primary limiting factors in the securitization of 
commercial and industrial loans.10  Indeed, when their piece was published in 1995, the 
credit derivatives market was still relatively young.  But since then, the growth of 
collateralized loan and debt obligations (CLOs/CDOs) has been remarkable, due in no 
small part to the gradual standardization of commercial loan documents, the adoption of 
over-collateralization, creating various priority-pay classes of securities, and the use of 
compensatory structures and incentives for investment managers that minimize agency 
conflicts – all structuring tools first perfected in the commercial and residential 
securitization markets.  While not nearly as consistent as the home loan market, 
commercial loan terms have become more standard due to the maturation of the 
syndicated loan market and lender consolidation.  The subordination and pay-down 
structure of CLO/CDO tranches is a practice that was lifted directly from the collateralized 
mortgage obligation (CMO) market.  Furthermore, just as it has become commonplace for 
servicers to hold an interest in the most junior classes of mortgage securitizations, thereby 
aligning their interests with that of the more senior investors (who presumably have less 
capacity and desire to monitor the collateral) so do CDO/CLO managers routinely hold 
unsecuritized portions of the underlying collateral.  Incentives for investment managers to 
actively monitor CLO/CDO collateral, such as tying their compensation to recovery rates, 
are comparable to compensatory agreements for special servicers in the mortgage market. 
Pooling has become such a pervasive force in modern finance that the economic 
system could hardly operate without it.  With its heavy capital requirements, relatively 
                                       
10 E. Sirri and P. Tufano, p.117. 
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homogenous character and steady cash flows, no market is more dependent on pooling 
(and possibly influential to its existence) than real estate. 
 
The Transfer of Economic Resources and Asymmetric Information 
Another of Merton’s basic functions of a financial system is its ability to facilitate 
the transfer of economic resources across time, geographic boundaries and industries.  
This function raises many key issues with respect to real property, particularly since real 
estate is generally long-lasting asset, the qualities of which vary by individual and 
industrial preference, and can rarely be accomplished with just local resources. 
Although the homogeneity and predictability of cash flow associated real estate 
lend themselves perfectly to interregional investment (ultimately through securitization) 
these qualities were not always apparent to investors.  The early mortgage market (and 
for that matter, virtually all early attempts at inter-spatial, -temporal or -industrial transfer 
of economic resources) was severely limited by the disparity of available information 
between lenders and the counterparty, be it the borrower, local agent, solicitor or 
mortgage broker.   
Baskin traces many of the products used to overcome agency issues (brought on 
by asymmetric information) to developments in interregional residential and commercial 
mortgage finance.  Per Baskin, many of the advances in railroad-related security interest 
and liens were initially established in U.S. real estate finance, and earlier still in real 
property law in Great Britain.   
Tradition as well as restrictions in certain regions against out-of-state lending made 
long-distance mortgage investment virtually non-existent prior to 1900.  There were a few 
short-lived attempts to facilitate interregional lending, notably the emergence of “national 
building associations” in the mid-1800’s.  These lenders paid third-party solicitors to 
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establish lending branches, often hundreds of miles away, to originate and monitor home 
loans to the outside investors’ specifications.  This was comparable to the emergence of 
“lending agents” around the same time.  These agents (often bankers, lawyers or builders 
who knew the local market) would sell their expertise and knowledge of the area to 
outside lenders wishing to invest.  Agency problems notwithstanding (i.e. compensation 
to agents or solicitors was often dependent upon the amount of loans originated) these 
functions never gained widespread acceptance, and when land prices collapsed toward 
the end of the 19th century, so did the fragile infrastructure for long-distance mortgage 
lending.  Of the 240 national building associations founded in the 1800’s, only six 
remained by the early 1900’s, all of which restricted their activities to their local markets.11 
Interregional lending was revived in large part to the formation of the Federal 
Housing Authority (FHA) in 1934, and later the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(FNMA, or “Fannie Mae”) in 1938.  To help solve the housing shortage as a result of the 
Depression, Fannie Mae was mandated to provide liquidity to the mortgage market by 
purchasing FHA and Veterans Administration (VA) loans from lenders.  Eventually a 
Fannie Mae spin-off, the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA, or “Ginnie 
Mae”) issued the first mortgage-backed pass-through securities in 1970.  FNMA, which 
largely financed its activities with debentures to that point, did not follow suit until 1981.  
Ultimately, Crane (1995) cites the development of the U.S. mortgage securitization market 
as one of the single most important developments in the transfer of economic resources 
spatially.  
Baskin (1988) argues that asymmetric information has had greater impact on 
financial innovation and capital structure decisions than any other historical market factor.  
                                       
11 D. Crane, et. al. The global financial system: A functional perspective, Harvard Business School Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1995, p.137. 
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Modern corporate finance theory tells us that capital structure decisions should balance 
the tax benefits of leverage versus bankruptcy costs.12  However, Baskin shows that the 
use of leverage (and corresponding market in new and innovative debt structures) was 
widespread prior to the advent of a corporate tax code in the United States in 1909 and 
1947 in Great Britain.   
Baskin concludes that corporate tax rates have had little affect on the evolution of 
debt products during much of the 20th century, and that the disparity of information 
between investors and those in need of capital (particularly railroad entrepreneurs) had 
far greater impact on the evolution of corporate debt products than the tax code.  With 
their predictable cash flow and progress toward standardization, debt instruments (more 
so than equity issues) were pivotal in the evolution of capital market innovation in most 
modern economies.  Investors hungry to put their dollars to work but severely lacking in 
local expertise to make informed investment decisions abroad, and burned by rampant 
fraudulent equity offerings (such as the collapse of the South Sea Company in 1720) 
ultimately sought to reduce perceived risk via mortgage bonds and direct loans secured 
by a first lien on the venture’s assets.  Structures and language that were initially 
perfected in U.S. real estate loan documents (the roots of which are in English real 
property law) were modified and adopted to railroad mortgages to help stimulate 
interregional investment. 
Franks and Sussman (1999) describe how different insolvency “regimes” evolved in 
Great Britain and the United States during this period, which ultimately had a tremendous 
impact on the particular strength and scope of first priority liens within each of those 
countries.  They argue that these fundamentally different insolvency “regimes” greatly 
                                       
12 See F. Modigliani and M. Miller, “Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: A correction,” American 
Economic Review, Volume 53, June 1963, p.433-42. 
 18
affected the process of financial innovation within those two countries.  In particular, the 
English standard served to limit the social and economic benefits of innovation since the 
strict bankruptcy powers granted to the senior secured creditor made that class virtually 
the only position in the capital structure acceptable to potential outside investors.  The 
development of innovative debt instruments in the United States spurred by informational 
asymmetries was effectively squelched in Great Britain because of the strict insolvency 
conditions in that country.  In its defense, the English contracting standard resulted in 
little ambiguity among investors of that region, and consequently had the socially 
beneficial effect of judicial and legislative efficiency.  Furthermore (as we will see later in 
this paper) the evolution of bankruptcy receivership in the U.S. with respect to defunct 
railroads in the late-1800’s illustrates the potential consequences of judicial 
(re)interpretation of financial contracts for the benefit of unfettered securities innovation.  
In particular, U.S. bankruptcy courts have been influenced by political and/or regulatory 
concerns (either real or imaginary) in the defunct enterprise, and subsequently have not 
always acted in the best interest of creditors. 
 
Risk Management 
Individuals and firms depend immensely on the financial system to manage 
various forms of risk often via innovative financial products.  Progress in securities design 
has allowed investors to more precisely isolate the risk and return components of a 
financial transaction.  An innovative financial product helps to “complete” the market by 
connecting a particular investment and return outcome with a specific set of 
contingencies.  Market participants are therefore left with the logical choice of accepting 
only those risks they are most capable and willing to bear, and allocating the rest to 
another party who presumably is more appropriate to bear those isolated risks.   
 19
The ability of a properly functioning financial system to allow for the management 
of risk has real economic benefits.  Mason (1995) uses simple neoclassical economic 
theory to illustrate this point.  He states that individuals, who derive utility from the 
consumption of goods and services after an initial capital investment to produce those 
goods and services, are the fundamental real economic unit.  Individuals are locked in a 
cycle of economic investment and consumption, and presumably would prefer to 
maximize their utility through greater lifetime consumption.  However, the investment 
and consumption cycle is veiled in uncertainty (i.e. there is no guaranteed outcome to the 
capital allocation decision.)  Individuals therefore prefer to maximize overall consumption 
while minimizing the risk associated with investment.   
Mason points out that individuals are the ultimate owners of all economic 
resources, and therefore are the ultimate bearers of all risk.  When an individual manages 
his/her risk profile, it is assumed some personal risk is acceptable.  But depending upon 
the qualities and characteristics of the individual, not every form of risk is appropriate for 
every individual.  A financial system must facilitate the allocation of risk among 
participants per their individual capacity to bear certain risks and not others.  
Furthermore, securities and markets must be “complete” in order to operate properly.  
That is, there must be a product available for every contingent possibility of risk for the 
financial system to run efficiently.  Where situations arise in which risk is allocated 
arbitrarily, innovative products help to complete the market by refining and reallocating 
that risk to the most willing and able market participant. 
Managing the risk/return profile of real estate investment has been fertile ground 
for innovative financial products.  In plotting the historical evolution of securities design, 
Finnerty (1992) shows that the process of reallocating the various risk components of real 
estate (particularly with respect to credit risk and other perils associated with the 
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concentration of capital, and various cash flow risks, such as interest rate, prepayment 
and extension risk) has been a motivating force in securities design for decades.  In 
particular, commercial and residential mortgage-backed securities and collateralized 
mortgage obligations have played an integral role in how market participants 
conceptualize the bundling and distribution of risk.  These market-driven, efficient means 
of allocating capital resources and distributing risk have arguably provided greater 
stability and managed growth to the real property markets, and therefore enhanced 
overall economic welfare at a fundamental level.   
Advances in security design have allowed society to better manage the risks 
associated with real property investment – capital decisions we might not otherwise make 
in the absence of risk sharing and management.  Ultimately, the myriad of innovative 
financial products related to real estate serve dual crucial roles: 1) they allow individuals 
to fashion preferred contingent patterns of consumption of a fundamental social product 
(i.e. space) and 2) they facilitate the allocation of the many risks associated with the 
production and maintenance of that product to those individuals most willing and able to 
bear the risk.  
 
Merton’s “Spiral of Innovation” 
 As described earlier in this paper, the financial system consists of intermediaries 
and markets in competition to fulfill Merton’s six fundamental functions as efficiently and 
profitably as possible.  However, there seems to exist a process by which the costs 
associated with innovation are reduced as products migrate from relatively opaque 
institutions (i.e. banks, insurance companies) to market-driven forces.  Indeed, in his 
seminal paper on the functional perspective, Merton notes that Finnerty’s review (1988 
and 1992) of financial engineering “suggests a pattern in which products offered initially 
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by intermediaries ultimately move to markets.”13  The recent and continued growth in 
efficient, low-cost capital markets products would suggest the role of institutions is 
diminishing, and studies exist supporting this claim.14  However, as Ross notes above, 
empirical evidence shows that markets largely remain “institutional markets” whereby 
relatively opaque intermediaries (or institutions) are not the sole participants in the 
market, but are certainly the most active.  Furthermore, Merton also sees an integral on-
going role for institutions in the evolution of securities design, particularly where the 
products are relatively new, low-volume and non-standardized. 
 The process by which new products are introduced, eventually accepted, 
standardized, and adopted by higher volume markets is well documented.  However, 
Merton rejects the notion that the role of intermediaries in financial innovation is 
disappearing.  Instead, he describes a dynamic, interactive process in which product 
design oscillates between institutional inception and market standardization in an on-
going effort to provide the basic functions of the financial system more efficiently.  
During periods of strong innovation, a large number of new products are introduced by 
many relatively opaque institutions.  These intermediary institutions full-well expect most 
of their successful products to eventually be copied and standardized, issued in greater 
numbers, and ultimately move to capital market efficiency.  This is comparable to the 
way private equity funds expect (even hope for) successful ventures to eventually migrate 
toward lower-cost, more-plentiful sources of market-driven capital. 
 Ultimately, Merton recognizes that institutions and markets are closely intertwined 
in the process of “completing the market” and moving the financial system toward greater 
                                       
13 R. Merton, p.26. 
14 See M.C. Keely, “Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking,” American Economic Review, 
December 1990, p.1183-1200, and G. Gorton and G. Pennachi, “Money market funds and finance 
companies: Are they the banks of the future?” in M. Klausner and L. White, Eds., Structural Change in 
Banking, Irwin, Homewood, IL, 1992. 
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efficiency.  Financial intermediaries serve an important role in recognizing that a 
particular function of the financial system is underserved, and subsequently “creating and 
testing new products as a part of the general financial innovation process” to capitalize 
upon these inefficiencies.15  By following the evolution of a given function rather than the 
time path of an particular product, Merton devises a “spiral of innovation” whereby the 
financial system is pushed toward greater efficiency via an array of products originally 
devised by relatively opaque institutions that address the functional needs of the system.  
As a new offering increasingly reflects the standards and conditions of trading markets, 
intermediaries are consequently free to devise new products and trading strategies in 
response the changing demands society places upon the system, which in turn leads to 
more volume, increased trading profits, and greater incentive to create new products and 
markets, and so on.  Ultimately, the markets represent the most immediate barometer of 
financial system stability and efficiency, but it is the intermediaries that are best-suited to 
respond to these signals via the creation of new financial products. 
Under this model, the symbiotic relationship between financial institutions and 
markets is revealed by the particular function(s) a series of products serve rather than the 
time path of a particular product.  Intermediaries must adapt to shifts in the functional 
requirements of the financial system by investing in the design and marketing of new 
products.  Only those institutions that are rigidly attached to a particular product will 
suffer (and potentially demise) as a result of the migration of products toward market 
efficiency. 
 
The Role of Systemic Shocks and Economic Volatility 
                                       
15 R. Merton, p.26. 
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Tufano (1995) enhances Merton’s “spiral of innovation” by suggesting that 
macroeconomic factors and exogenous shocks to the financial system help spur the 
process of innovation.  These structural shifts do not alter the fundamental quality of 
Merton’s six functions.  As mentioned before, the basic functions a financial system must 
provide remain relatively constant in all economies throughout history.  Instead, 
macroeconomic and industrial cycles help determine which functions are of greatest 
importance to a particular economy at a given moment in time, and upset the 
cost/benefit relationship of existing products and markets.  This ultimately motivates 
intermediaries to create and market new products, and the spiral of innovation begins 
again.  For instance, during periods of considerable instability (either in a particular sector 
or the overall economy), the risk management role of the financial system and its ability 
to handle asymmetric information and agency conflicts may be the most crucial functions 
it serves.  During periods of relative calm, managing growth through the efficient pooling 
and transfer of economic resources may rise to the forefront.  
In either case, each of Merton’s six functions need to be addressed in some 
manner if an economy is to be properly served by its financial system.  But Tufano points 
out that one or more functions may play a greater role during a given period depending 
upon macroeconomic factors, industrial cycles, or fundamental shifts in consumption 
patterns.  Tax and regulatory changes (which upon first glance seem to be the motivating 
factor behind many periods of financial innovation) are often merely reflective of 
underlying cyclical changes in the economy or a particular sector.  Tufano argues that 
taxes and regulatory constraints are usually developed in response to shifts in 
fundamental conditions, not the other way around.  Taxes and regulation can play a 
major role in defining the cost/benefit relationship of a given financial product during 
periods of relative economic calm.  But exogenous shocks and macroeconomic volatility 
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alter the demands individuals place on the financial system, which in turn upsets the 
cost/benefit relationship of many markets and products.  This renders the existing 
institutional framework obsolete and clears the path for new products and services. 
 
Parallels Between Defunct Railroads and the Savings and Loan Crisis 
Tufano and Merton’s models are readily applicable to the boom and bust cycle of 
the railroad industry in the United States.  During the early stages of the industry, 
railroads were almost entirely financed via locally-raised equity subscriptions.  Once 
internal and local equity sources of capital were exhausted, railroad entrepreneurs turned 
almost exclusively to first mortgage bonds to finance their operations rather than tap 
additional equity capital from distant sources.  Per Baskin earlier in this paper, the 
decision to issue mortgage debt was almost certainly a function of the informational 
disparity between management and potential investors at the time since there was no 
discernable tax advantage associated with this choice.  Early railroad mortgages in the 
United States were often used for westward expansion (where the prospects of success 
were nebulous at best) and secured by existing tracks and equipment in New England, 
New York and Pennsylvania.  Railways and related equipment were considered excellent 
collateral since the continued use and resale value of the assets would likely be 
significant in the event of default.   
Although a tremendous amount of U.S. railroad mortgage debt was issued in the 
1800’s, few of the actual bond structures could be considered “innovative.”  As mentioned 
earlier, the language perfecting first priority mortgage liens on railroad assets was initially 
drafted in standard real estate loan documents.  If anything, advances in U.S. railroad 
bonds in the early to mid-1800’s owe more to developments in railroad finance in Great 
Britain than to home-grown innovation.  Public securities markets in England were first 
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started in order to trade government issues (particularly war debt).  The first railroads in 
Great Britain were largely viewed as public works, and indeed, the Bank of England 
played a major in supporting early railway ventures in that country.  Thus, railroad 
mortgage bonds in England were often viewed as quasi-municipal securities, and 
eventually traded along side straight government debt on the early bond exchanges.   
This paradigm carried over to the debt markets in the United States.  State and 
local governments were key subscribers of early railroad initiatives, and the Federal 
government provided much of the initial capital for the Union Pacific railroad.  However, 
the scale of U.S. railroad debt dwarfed that of England.  Great Britain enjoyed relative 
peace beginning with the downfall of Napoleon to the First World War, and consequently 
that country’s war debt was reduced to nil by the early 1900’s.  The United States 
government was left with a $2.0 billion deficit following the Civil War, although that sum 
was completely repaid within a few decades.  The U.S. railroad industry, on the other 
hand, had issued $4.8 billion in outstanding securities (mostly mortgage bonds) by 1878.  
By 1893, that figure had swelled to $9.9 billion.16  Ultimately, bond structures initially 
perfected in real estate finance and the aura of legitimacy provided by government 
investment cleared the way for the widespread acceptance of railroad securities by the 
investing public in the United States. 
Railroads did not mark fertile ground for what can be considered truly innovative 
financial contracts until the failure of much of the industry in the late 1800’s.  As Tufano 
predicts, it took a secular shift (or collapse) in market conditions to bring about this 
change.  Railroads at the time faced exceptionally high fixed costs and immense 
competition due to low barriers to entry and subsequent overbuilding.  Relatively opaque 
                                       
16 J.B. Baskin, “The development of corporate financial markets in Britain and the United States, 1600-1914,” 
Business History Review, Volume 62, p.208. 
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public and private entities (bankruptcy courts and investment bankers, respectively) 
devised creative responses to the ills plaguing the railroad sector via innovative security 
contracts and governance structures.  In particular, the creation of receiver certificates and 
the establishment of the bankruptcy receivership process set the stage for a large-scale 
restructuring of the railroad industry, and ultimately, further innovation.   
Receiver certificates are comparable to modern debtor-in-possession (DIP) 
financing.  They represent a form of super-senior debt secured by the entire assets of the 
defunct company, including those assets already pledged as security to other debt 
holders.  The company could use the capital infusion to continue operations during 
restructuring or liquidation.  As is the case with DIP loans today, many of the largest and 
most-senior railroad creditors also purchased receiver certificates despite the unpaid 
balance on prior obligations because 1) the likelihood of repayment on the certificates 
(which carried an above market interest rate) was very high, and 2) those in a super-
senior position of the capital structure were considered to be in a more advantageous 
position during restructuring.  In fact, with respect to the second point, many of the 
investment bankers (particularly J.P. Morgan) who were called upon to create and market 
railroad receiver certificates eventually held significant balances of the certificates, and 
used this position to guide the restructuring in their favor. 
The ideas of Franks and Sussman described earlier regarding the U.S. insolvency 
regime provide greater insight on the implications of receiver certificates.   In their desire 
to rescue what they perceived to be a public good, bankruptcy courts dramatically 
redefined existing financial contracts by allowing the super-senior form of financing.  
Ultimately, it is unclear to what extent the courts were acting in the nation’s best interest, 
or were simply manipulated by bankers who stood to gain from restructuring the 
industry.   
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Furthermore, courts and certificate holders used their position not only to redefine 
and/or nullify prior financial contracts, but also to coerce additional capital from 
creditors.  In order to save the company, additional cash (above and beyond what was 
provided by the receiver certificates) was needed to fund on-going operations and 
restructure existing debt.  The bankruptcy court (on the advice of the creditor committee, 
which was largely controlled by certificate holders) determined the “upset value” as well 
as the terms of exchange for new securities to recapitalized the defunct railroad.  If a 
creditor did not wish to exchange its existing position into new securities, then the 
claimant received the upset value (usually just pennies on the dollar).  If the creditor 
instead chose to comply with the recapitalization, the terms of the exchange usually 
required the creditor to provide an “assessment” (i.e. cash) in addition to handing over 
the non-performing securities.  Depending upon the original type of security held, 
creditors who accepted the exchange offer usually received some form of longer-dated, 
lower-coupon debt as compensation, often with warrants or convertible to common 
stock.   
Other structures used in exchanges were income bonds, an innovation of the time 
where interest was contingent upon the operating results of the company, and cumulative 
preferred stock, which was in use before the late 1800’s but gained greater acceptance 
following the restructuring of the railroads.  Put and call structures, springing liens, 
prepayment penalties, and subordination were also not uncommon.  Although these 
structural twists were not necessarily innovative, the various combinations and frequency 
of use in exchange offers were unprecedented prior to this period.  Ultimately, upset 
values were often set so low as to make compliance with the exchange offer the only 
reasonable choice for a claimant.  All of these events – spurred by a collapse in the 
industry and encouraged by the existing insolvency regime – marked an evolutionary 
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leap for financial innovation, but at what cost?  This period marked a radical 
reinterpretation of the strength of existing financial contracts and cast doubt on the 
independence of bankruptcy courts, all for the sake of unimpeded securities innovation 
and an industry with a questionable future. 
Turning our attention to a more recent example, Tufano and Merton’s ideas can be 
applied to the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980’s.  Once again, this period of 
financial innovation was sparked by an extraordinary collapse in a particular sector (this 
time, real estate) and required considerable intervention by outside regulators and 
intermediaries to creatively handle the crisis.  Although the product used to handle this 
crisis (commercial mortgage-backed securities, or CMBS) existed prior to this period, the 
large scale use of that product was unprecedented.  But key differences exist between 
this example and the previous case with the railroad sector.  The government 
organization (in conjunction with the structuring and distribution expertise of investment 
banks) that intervened in the thrift bailout was not beholden to relatively opaque and 
self-serving credit committees and bankruptcy courts, unlike the previous example.  
Instead, the savings and loan bailout was ultimately a function of relatively transparent 
market-driven forces and signaled the maturation of the commercial mortgage 
securitization market – an evolutionary leap along Merton’s spiral of innovation.   
During the 1980’s, tax shelter syndicates and thrifts were the dominant suppliers of 
capital to the commercial real estate industry.  Syndicates of investors attracted by the tax 
benefits of real estate provided a tremendous amount of capital to commercial 
development projects during this period, often irrespective of the cash-flow projections of 
the particular project.  Savings and loans were aggressive commercial real estate lenders 
following deregulation of that industry in 1980 with the Depository Institutions 
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Deregulation and Monetary Control Act.  That act allowed thrifts, among other things, to 
service commercial mortgages in addition to their traditional residential portfolios.   
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated many of the tax benefits associated with 
real estate, and syndicate financing subsequently withdrew as a major source of funds.  
Furthermore, chronic overbuilding eventually led to depressed real estate values, and 
thrifts, banks and insurance companies all suffered considerable losses in their 
commercial mortgage portfolios.  This lead to a dramatic pull-back in real estate lending 
which created a liquidity crisis in the sector, exacerbating the situation only further.  By 
the early 1990’s, Congress had stepped-in with the creation of the Resolution Trust 
Company (RTC) to facilitate the bailout of the ailing savings and loan industry.  RTC’s 
mandate was to liquidate assets (largely non-performing real estate loans) acquired from 
insolvent thrifts as quickly and efficiently as possible.  To do this, RTC turned to the then-
unproven CMBS market. 
Although CMBS existed before these events (Finnerty traces commercial mortgage-
backed bonds back to early 1984) the heavy volume of loans securitized by the RTC 
signaled the arrival of this asset class as an accepted capital market product.17  Many 
CMBS market conventions and structural standards such as subordination, 
overcollateralization, cash reserve accounts and the role of special and master servicers 
were established during the RTC years.  Furthermore, many insurance companies, 
pension funds and commercial banks witnessed the success of RTC’s foray into CMBS, 
and quickly followed suit as a means of restructuring their balance sheets.  In all, RTC 
was extremely efficient in its mission, and by 1996 had divested itself completely.  Some 
                                       
17 J.D. Finnerty, "An overview of corporate securities innovation,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 
Volume 4, Issue 4, p.29. 
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argue that the only way for the RTC to have been more successful would have been to 
outright demolish many seized properties in the most-severely overbuilt markets. 
This example evokes similarities with the previous case of the railroad industry, 
but with crucial differences.  Once again, excess capacity led to a cyclical downturn in a 
particular sector resulting in a period of unprecedented financial innovation, as Tufano 
predicts.  With the collapse in real estate values, the specific functions the financial 
system is called upon to deliver did not necessarily change, but rather were reprioritized 
to reflect the special needs of the time.  For instance, the risk management role of the 
financial system is clearly a function that was underserved during the 1980’s when capital 
flowed steadily to projects with no substantive economic basis from lenders incapable (or 
unwilling) to accurately measure and bear such risks.   
Instead of relatively opaque institutions (bankruptcy courts and investment 
bankers whose motives were questionable in the case of the railroad industry) forming a 
highly-subjective solution to the problem, the RTC turned to a relatively new capital 
market product.  Not only did this development mark the maturation of the asset class, 
but one can argue that the CMBS market could only have experienced that type of rapid 
growth via some measure of forced supply motivated by regulatory intervention.  In 
contrast to the aura of legitimacy enjoyed by a particular industry (i.e. the railroads) 
which contributed to a false sense of security for their investors, the government 
endorsed a particular market via the RTC, the result of which was a period of 
considerable innovation and market growth.  Ultimately, these events played an integral 
role in forming the modern definition of risk sharing and management by reallocating 
real property risk to those most willing and capable of bearing it. 
The evolutionary future of the CMBS market is debatable, particularly with respect 
to the role of intermediaries.  Merton’s spiral of innovation tells us that institutions should 
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have an on-going role in the commercial mortgage securitization process if they can 
adapt to shifting market conditions with new and innovative products.  However, the 
strength and immediacy of market forces on this asset class have made excess trading 
profits and market incompleteness arguably nil.  Non-recourse commercial mortgages 
(the mainstay of many real estate lenders) represent one issue associated with the savings 
and loan crisis that was not entirely resolved during the RTC years.  These products pose 
an ethical dilemma by which lenders are encouraged to swell loan portfolios, often 
irrespective of market conditions, whereby they ostensibly become “too big to fail.”  This 
strategy shifts property risk from lenders and depositors to the federal government, and 
ultimately U.S. taxpayers (who absorbed most of the losses during the collapse of the late 
1980’s).  Bank and thrift capital reserve requirements attempt to mitigate this issue, but 
perhaps this quandary is better addressed via security design in the form of mortgage 
products that required some measure of culpability by the borrower.  This may signal the 
next cyclical wave of innovation and activity by intermediaries.  On the other hand, 
Tufano might suggest their best hope is to wait for another secular collapse before 
committing considerable resources to this market again.  
 
Closing Remarks 
 Although there exists a number of competing viewpoints regarding the evolution 
of securities design, most of the theories stem from discussions of either the existing 
institutional framework or the particular functions new products and markets serve.  
Nevertheless, the debate as to which school of thought most accurately and convincingly 
explains the process of financial innovation is unlikely to subside anytime soon.  These 
are fundamental questions that affect the way market participants view their inherent 
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purpose and goals.  In many respects, this discussion represents the financial system at its 
most introspective.   
I have attempted to show that Merton’s functional perspective provides a more 
robust and adaptable framework with which to explain security design and the financial 
system in general.  Ross makes a compelling argument in favor of the importance of 
institutions, and Merton certainly sees a crucial on-going role for organizations such as 
banks, insurance companies, and regulatory bodies in the process of innovation.  But any 
attempt to adequately explain the structure and purpose of the financial system in terms 
of relatively static organizations acting in their own self-interest to circumvent or 
manipulate constraints imposed by the regulatory and contractual framework is 
superficial at best.   
Ultimately, the institutional perspective is temporally biased and fails to explain 
why a sector such as real estate lends itself so readily to new and innovative products.  
Some of the greatest periods of innovation are clearly motivated by macroeconomic 
change or industrial cycles.  Regardless of whether they are cognizant of it, institutions 
have made the strongest case for their continued survival and profitability by accurately 
recognizing these fundamental shifts and responding with new products and services that 
address certain basic economic functions the financial system is called upon to deliver. 
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